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In view of Russia's importance and international
position and considering the internal ratio of forces,
Yeltsin's re-election as Russia's President can be examined
at several levels. The confirmation of the president, who
is regarded in the West as the champion of reform, has
been interpreted in western capitals as a guarantee that
Russia would continue its reform policies and the pursuit
of democracy, and fully endorse a market-oriented
economy. This, in turn, is expected to provide a new basis
for co-operation with the West and for a common search
for solutions to the issues brought about by the new world
order. It is assumed that, in opting for Yeltsin, Russia has
chosen its place within that order and that it can be
expected to act accordingly.
The defeat of the communists is seen as the
expression of the electorate's decision to endorse Yeltsin's
line, despite all his faults, and of their desire for a better
and more democratic life. In the opinion of many analysts,
it was precisely this choice between Yeltsin and the
communists which induced so many Russians to cast their
vote for the controversial president, in preference to the
return of the communists. Moreover, by throwing in their
lot with Yeltsin, they seem to have stemmed the rise of
communism in Russia, and the CP may never be able again
to win as many votes as it did under Zyuganov.
Russia is expected to emerge from the presidential
elections with its position on the world political scene as
strong as before, if not stronger. This would have the effect
of preventing unnecessary tensions or undesirable
measures.
Of course, such reading of the new Russian
situation has a certain relevance, both as a reflection of
the current state of affairs and of the wish that Russia
under Yeltsin would follow a pro-western course and
favour the stabilisation of that major nation.
The above analysis of the Russian situation,
however, is the result of a broader strategic perspective
whose primary objective is stability in Europe and the
desire that Russia may never again become the focal point
of a movement motivated by ideological values opposite
to those of the western world. As the price of this vision
of Russia and of its president, western analysts are prone
to forget or overlook numerous indications which present
Yeltsin and his policies in a completely different light.
It would thus seem more appropriate to ask: What
can be expected of the new Yeltsin policy and to what
extent can it meet western expectations?
Interestingly enough, in their approach to Russian
foreign policy, both presidential candidates expressed
strikingly similar views. It remains to be seen to what
extent Yeltsin copied the communists also in this field,
but one thing is certain: their foreign policy platforms
manifest a striking similarity of objectives and definition
of interests.
The first set of new demands concerns faster
reintegration of the post-Soviet area, i.e., the
Commonwealth of Independent States. It is claimed that
a series of mistakes had been committed in this field and
that faster economic, security and political advancement
of Russia cannot be achieved without seeking stronger
links with the former Soviet republics. These links would,
at the same time, stem the further erosion of Russian
positions in some of the former republics as well as being
a means of halting conflicts. With its new policy Russia
must provide a foundation for new forms of diverse links
and make Moscow be seen by all republics as the focal
point of their prosperity and stability. We can expect
strong Russian action along these lines and the launching
of new mechanisms to reinforce the Commonwealth and
to demonstrate the benefits of co-operation. This would
also largely resolve the problem of the vast number of
Russians (24 million of them) living outside Russia and
create conditions for more effective concerted action in
relations with third countries.
The second set of issues in the focus of both
presidential candidates was the restitution to Russia of
the status of super power. This lofty position is inherent
in the political thinking of the Russian ,lite irrespective of
political belief or party affiliation. The disintegration of
the great state was so quick and so unexpected as to catch
both the Russian elite and the population at large
unprepared for the new situation, in which their country
was exposed as underdeveloped, removed from the
mainstream civilisation trends and too weak to continue
in the role of a super state. Years of indoctrination have
left their indelible mark, and any reference to the great
role and position of Russia as a world power is guaranteed
to win broad support. However difficult it may be to
achieve this, there should be no doubt that Yeltsin will try
his best to reinstate Russia in the centre of world affairs.
Whether this will be done by political means, or just by
continuing to insist on the greatness of Russia and on the
leading position that is her due, is of no relevance. What
is psychologically important for the Russian political
establishment is the recognition that their country is a great
power and that it is entitled to a special place in
international relations. The means and the instruments
whereby to produce this new image of Russia have to be
devised in their Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
The third group of issues are a direct result of the
stance of a super power that Russia adopts in international
relations. By stressing its size, tradition and the still existing
nuclear might, Russia will endeavour to extend its
influence on the West as much as possible. This will be
particularly reflected in its efforts to influence those
western decisions that directly affect Russian neighbours
(NATO expansion, the Balkans). In spite of general
proclamations of the wish to co-operate with the West, it
is to be expected that the scope of topics and areas of
confrontation between Russian and western interests will
continue to widen and that Russia will seek opportunities
to assert its interests. This new stage of co-operation and
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confrontation between Russia and the West' is aptly
described by the Foreign Secretary Evgenny Primakov,
who declared that Russia should stop treating good
relations with the West as a top priority of its foreign
policy, since this "does not coincide with her interests".
In the light of Primakov's earlier claims that Ru"ssia had
invested too much into these new relations and had gained
too little, and that there was need for a system of
international relations wherein no single state can assume
the leading role, it is evident that the aim is to bring about
a situation in which Russian views will be taken into
account. To reinforce Russia's special role as permanent
member of the Security Council, efforts will be intensified
to gain membership of the G-7 and to assert influence on
some NATO decisions (expansion of the security system).
The means to be employed in attaining these goals,
however, will presumably depend on domestic policy
factors. At the moment, the country is still on the brink of
a crisis. Yeltsin's unrealistic pre-election promises are
bound to generate additional discontent. According to
some statements, Russia's budget for this year has already
been spent. And there is the war in Chechnya, too.
Furthermore, the so-called pillars of stability: the army,
the police and the state apparatus have fallen on lean times
and are supporting themselves largely by illegal activities.
In a situation like this, a policy which aspires to re-
establish Russia as a superpower has a very meagre
material basis to operate from, and it is highly questionable
what else, apart from rhetoric, can be used to build up the
proclaimed dynamic approach of Russian foreign policy.
At the same time, this state of affairs might help to
intensify the growth of nationalistic and pseudo-
imperialistic tendencies in Russia, which Zbigniew
Brzezinski, for one, expects to become the major
components of the new foreign policy.
The Russian Duma, in which communists continue
to hold the majority, will have a chance to level criticism
against the President's foreign policy decisions, even
though he remains outside their reach due to the powers
and autonomy his office entails. Those who are disgruntled
with the domestic conditions and development of Russia
will find ample scope in this nationalistic and pseudo-
imperialistic course to promote their ideas and to
articulate their own vision of Russia's place in the world
community.
With the additional element of the new tripartite
division of powers in the Kremlin: Yeltsin -Tchernomirdin
- Lebed, there will evidently be room enough for all kinds
of combinations and alliances, leaving an impact also in
the field of foreign policy. In the more immediate future,
however, sharp confrontations are to be expected at the
top. First of all, Tchernomirdin and Lebed will have to set
the limits of their own powers, with the winner having to
contend with Yeltsin to the end of the latter's term of office
- or life. In this manner, the new tripolarity in the Kremlin
opens up additional areas of instability, with consequences
that will not be long in waiting.
Built on such a foundation, Russian foreign policy
will be constantly obliged to assess the current ratio of
forces in the Kremlin and to consider the priorities of each
chief protagonist. In some segments, it will have more
freedom (i.e., attempts to reintegrate the former Soviet
republics), but in matters concerning the delicate fabric
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of the relations between Russia and the West it will have
to lend a careful ear to the messages emanating from the
Kremlin. In pace with the vicissitudes of Russian
nationalistic tendencies, of the mood of the Russian
political ,lite and of the struggle for dominance in the
Kremlin, Russian foreign policy will probably vacillate
between rhetoric and filling the vacuums that are formed.
The expansion of NATO will continue to be
regarded as a threat to Russia, and the support will be
sought of the Russian public, which has decisively rejected
any idea of a rapprochement between NATO and Russia.
Intensified reintegration within the Commonwealth of
Independent States is likewise expected to proceed,
prompted by the general belief in the necessity and
beneficial effects of this undertaking. It is in this light that
we must regard Russia's efforts to maintain its positions
in the Balkans and the demands for a reduction of the
American role there.
Some Russian advances to China (new strategic
partnership) or to Iran (sales of arms and nuclear
technology) are designed to keep up the appearance of
Russia's capacity for global action, however, always taking
good care not to overdo this and to jeopardise the present
Russo-Western relations.
In the countries of the former socialist bloc, on the
other hand, Russian foreign policy has not only missed all
the chances it had in the beginning but is even now still
unwilling to treat those countries as equal partners. There
is overwhelming obsession with the need to prevent the
expansion of NATO and with the maintenance of
transport channels for Russian fuel and energy to the West.
It is therefore not surprising that the former socialist
countries insist on some form of association with NATO,
seeing in this a way to ensure their security and to build
up a basis for a new type of neighbourly relations with
Russia.
Domestically impoverished, at the crossroads of
change, burdened by internal strife, Russian foreign policy
during Yeltsin's new term of office is likely to be a mixture
of ends and means, with rather slim chances of success.
The claims that Russia would need 30-40 years to reach
the level of the least developed members of the European
Union are by no means exaggerated, and can be regarded
not only as an indicator of economic development but also
of the difficulties Russian foreign policy has to contend
with.
If Yeltsin's new mandate helps to alleviate at least
some of the current political tension and builds a basis
for a more relaxed view of foreign affairs, this could be a
major contribution to Russian stability. It remains to be
seen, of course, how long Yeltsin will be able to stay at the
head of Russia and what new alliances will be formed at
Kremlin's top. Russian foreign policy will of necessity be
just a reflection of the dilemmas which Yeltsin's re-election
has failed to resolve on a long-term basis.
•
